













evil’	 she	 did	 so	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 actions	 of	 Germans	 who	 appropriated	 the	
doctrines	 of	National	 Socialism	 “thoughtlessly”	 and	without	 obvious	 intentions	
to	 do	 evil.	 	 But,	 Arendt’s	 description	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 entails	 that	 such	
banality	can	be	found	even	in	a	democracy	such	as	the	USA.	The	relation	of	law	
and	morality	must	 therefore	be	unambiguous	 to	defend	 the	rule	of	 law	against	
the	rule	of	men.		However,	a	legal	philosophy	other	than	positivism	is	essential	to	
safeguard	 the	Republic	 against	 the	 overreach	 of	 executive	 power.	 	 And,	where	
the	 psychopathology	 of	 Donald	 Trump	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 America’s	 electoral	
discontent	 in	2020,	as	mental	health	professionals	have	argued,	 there	 is	all	 the	
more	 reason	 to	 take	 Arendt’s	 counsel	 especially	 seriously	 today.	 	 It	 is	 in	 this	















When political philosopher Hannah Arendt introduced the concept of ‘banality of 
evil’ she did so in reference to the actions of Germans who appropriated the doctrines 
of National Socialism “thoughtlessly” and without obvious intentions to do evil.  But, 
Arendt’s description of this phenomenon entails that such banality can be found even 
in a democracy such as the USA. The relation of law and morality must therefore be 
unambiguous to defend the rule of law against the rule of men.  However, a legal 
philosophy other than positivism is essential to safeguard the Republic against the 
overreach of executive power.  And, where the psychopathology of Donald Trump is 
at the core of America’s electoral discontent in 2020, as mental health professionals 
have argued, there is all the more reason to take Arendt’s counsel especially seriously 
today.  It is in this context that it is argued here that the American public must beware 
Trump’s inducement of America’s banality of evil.  
 
 




We live in and by the law.  It makes us what we are…And we argue about what it has decreed…We 
are subjects of law’s empire, liegemen to its methods and ideals, bound in spirit while we debate what 
we must therefore do. 
 





At the Precipice of Deformation 
Since the national election of 2016 and at the end of Donald Trump’s 
presidency in 2021, it has been unclear that the American republic is secure in the 
core of its being, that it is not faced with an existential threat. Two events especially 
attest to this disquiet: (1) the unprecedented assault on the US Capitol building on 06 
January 2021 by Trump’s “white-nationalist” and “right-wing” supporters, during a 
joint session of Congress held to certify the Electoral College vote of Joseph Biden as 
46th President of the United States of America,1 and (2) the resolve of the US House 
of Representatives to hold Trump accountable for “incitement to insurrection,” hence 
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the unprecedented second impeachment of Trump by a prevailing House vote of 232-
197 on 13 January 2021. Despite the USA’s political culture and structure defined by 
its Constitution, the Trump administration abuse of “the rule of law” has been amply 
documented such that a merely positivist philosophy of law is inadequate in the face 
of demagoguery such as Trump inflicted on long-honored traditions and institutions 
of governance.  For, such a legal philosophy can be manipulated easily to permit 
installation of laws not merely representative of distinctly partisan interests, but laws 
that in fact undermine the foundations of the constitutional order itself. 
Since his election to the presidency of the United States, Donald Trump and 
his administration have diminished time-honored commitments in both domestic and 
foreign policies to international and domestic justice long championed in its 
institutional structures.  The ideological slogan, ‘Make America Great Again’, heralds 
an “America-first” agenda that is strikingly isolationist, to the detriment of bilateral 
and multilateral political and economic relations, especially with European allies.  
Further, at the domestic level of electoral politics, the issues of racism and associated 
social and economic injustice have come to the fore of heightened public scrutiny 
once again. This is so despite federal legislation and efforts of civil society, since the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, to correct the course of the American ship of 
state and achieve equality of persons envisioned by the Founding Fathers of the 
republic. 
During the Congressional debates about Trump’s impeachment in 2019, and 
then at the end of Trump’s four years in office, and as the ideological rhetoric of the 
2020 national election has made starkly clear, the “White-Black” racial divide of the 
American public remains entirely problematic.  The domestic order is in peril, even as 
the long-honored constitutional “balance of powers” among the branches of 
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government is no guarantee of justice for all.  Trump’s mendacity, manifested in his 
incessant patently false utterances in public speeches, is alarming for the fact that he 
recognizes no legitimate limits to presidential power.  Through his presidential 
overreach and assumed prerogatives of a nigh-autocratic executive power, Trump has 
continued to push the American democracy to the test of institutional responses 
normally undertaken to safeguard the rule of law. 
More troublesome in the recent political scene of partisan contention is the 
insidious shift in public sentiment that bodes ill for the future of the American 
republic as a sustainable representative democracy.  For all too many, a patriot is a 
patriot if and only if partisan in relation to the two principal political parties. Trump’s 
repeated ideological appeals have bordered on the precipice of authoritarian and 
autocratic governance, pushing the boundaries of legitimate executive power out of 
place as measured by reasonably normative standards.  Thus, it is not surprising that, 
during Trump’s impeachment, members of Congress highlighted the “legend” of old, 
that Benjamin Franklin had uttered something of a warning at the time of the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787.  To the question, “Doctor, what have we got? A 
republic or a monarchy?”, Franklin is represented to have answered: “A republic, if 
you can keep it.”2 
Whether the story is true as a matter of historical record does not matter.  
What matters is its import for the fact of the contingency of the form of government 
that the Founding Fathers installed.  The mere fact of a foundational Constitution and 
extant federal, state, and municipal public laws are not a sufficient guarantee that, as 
Lincoln hoped in his famous Gettysburg Address, the American democracy would 
endure and not perish as a government of the people, by the people, for the people.  
Despite the popular vote and the legally established function of the Electoral College 
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to select the President-elect, Trump has betrayed all precedent with his appalling 
challenge to the validity of the presidential election of 2020. Along with his 
repudiation of tradition to concede the election, this is itself ominous in view of the 
large number of Republican Party voters who believe Trump’s otherwise baseless 
allegations of massive voter fraud, despite all official certifications to the contrary.3 
That Republican members of Congress likewise refrained from 
acknowledging Trump’s electoral loss speaks ill of the party’s readiness to defend the 
norms of electoral process in the face of Trump’s domineering demeanor. 4  
Notwithstanding state certifications of the vote and numerous losses in both state and 
federal courts, and despite US Attorney General William P. Barr’s rejection of claims 
of massive voter fraud,5 Trump continued to insist the presidential election was an 
unprecedented national “catastrophe,” even as he sought to have state legislatures 
overturn the popular vote and choose slates of electors who would ensure his win in 
the Electoral College vote.6 
Most alarming are Republican partisan calls for Trump to suspend the 
Constitution, to order (partial) martial law, and ensure a military-supervised 
presidential election all over again.7   Of course, there is some assurance that the 
military will not accommodate such drastic action, given pre-election remarks from 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley.8  But, ideological 
appeals such as Trump utters are designed to move the emotions of his Republican 
base of supporters.  Such appeals have the political efficacy of sophistical rhetoric 
that surreptitiously advances “the weaker argument,” thus dismissing the truth in 
favor of its semblance.  Wherever there is such semblance carrying its political 
efficacy among a public easily deceived by misinformation, one will find 
thoughtlessness precisely of the sort political philosopher Hannah Arendt 9 
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characterized in relation to the onset of National Socialism in post-Weimar Germany.  
And, it is from such thoughtlessness that otherwise “normal” people, including 
Americans, are moved to commit evil acts and take them to be politically, even 
legally, warranted despite reasonably grounded moral objection. 
Challenges to “the Rule of Law” 
Centrally at issue in the USA, in the immediate period of a post-Trump 
presidency, is the relation of law and morality, of how the rule of law is to be 
conceived, and how public conscience is to be guided thereby in the interest of 
sustained democratic governance.  In particular, what is to be challenged is a positivist 
conception of law that, while having its reputed advocates such as H.L.A. Hart,10 is 
not a sufficient bar to preempt the sort of political sophistry the Trump Administration 
has pursued merely in the interest of Trump himself.  Years ago, the Israeli legal, 
moral, and political philosopher Joseph Raz commented that, 
H.L.A. Hart is heir and torch-bearer of a great tradition in the philosophy of 
law which is realist and unromantic in outlook.  It regards the existence and 
content of the law as a matter of social fact whose connection with moral or 
any other values is contingent and precarious…[Hart] was anxious to dispel 
the philosophical mist which he found in both legal culture and legal theory…. 
 In particular [Hart’s approach to law] concerns the question whether it 
is ever the case that a rule is a rule of law because it is morally binding, and 
whether a rule can ever fail to be legally binding on the ground that is it 
morally unacceptable.11 
In a challenge to Hart’s legal positivism, German law professor Robert Alexy 
argued for a “necessary relation” between law and morality, in light of the fact that 
“individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily 
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make a claim to correctness,” in which case law is essentially connected to “a 
procedural universalistic morality.”12  In the context of an international political order 
with diverse nation-states, all appealing to the principle of sovereignty and the 
authority of national law despite allowances for municipal effect of international 
law,13 claims of a universalistic morality are met with ready critique. In fact, it is 
commonplace among philosophers of law to recognize a tradition of argument 
according to which there is a conflict between law and morality that is perhaps 
irremediable and insurmountable, even as both moral philosophers and legal 
philosophers seek to embody the requisites of justice in either morality or law.14 
In the case of the USA specifically, reputed jurisprudence scholar Robert P. 
George has argued, “Most modern commentators agree that the American founders 
were firm believers in natural law and sought to craft a constitution that would 
conform to its requirements, as they understood them, and embody its basic principles 
for the design of a just political order.”15  Further, he opined, “The framers of the 
Constitution sought to create institutions and procedures that would afford respect and 
protection to those basic rights (“natural rights”) that people possess, not as privileges 
or opportunities granted by the state, but as principles of natural law which it is a 
moral duty of the state to respect and protect.”16 
On this view, then, a positivist account of law is reasonably to be subordinated 
to a legal-philosophical account of the rule of natural law, of natural rights, in the 
event of a conflict about the authority of law, this as a matter of fulfilling the 
requisites of moral duty. The practical problem, however, is whether jurists would in 
fact appeal to natural law when adjudicating matters of fact in relation to “unwritten” 
law, when otherwise statutory law normally governs judicial deliberation and 
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judgment.  Ronald Dworkin’s account of law as “integrity,”17 perhaps, provides an 
alternative approach to settling procedural difficulties. 
“How can the law command,” Dworkin asks, “when the law books are silent 
or unclear or ambiguous?”18  He answers that, “legal reasoning is an exercise in 
constructive interpretation, that our law consists in the best justification of our legal 
practices as a whole, that it consists in the narrative story that makes of these practices 
the best they can be.”  Hence, the concept of constructive interpretation privileges a 
practice rather than a theory at the base of jurisprudence, that practice in which and 
consequent to which there is presented “the best justification” within a narrative taken 
to be practicable in that sense.  Accordingly, Dworkin has argued against the 
philosophy of legal positivism, speaking of the “gravitational force” that prior judicial 
decision has and that is more weighty than mere “judicial discretion.”19  On the 
constructive model, the task is “to identify the program of justice that best 
accommodates the community’s common convictions, for example, with no claim to a 
description of an objective moral universe.”20 
Dworkin is aware, of course, that, consistent with the doctrine of legal 
positivism, some philosophers “reject the idea that citizens have rights apart from 
what the law happens to give them,” even as “politicians…appeal to the rights of the 
people to justify a great part of what they want to do.”21  One may ask, in this context, 
what a government’s view should be in that case, that view, for example, represented 
in judicial decision.  Dworkin opines that in the American context there is dispute 
about “what particular rights citizens have,” observing that, in practice “the 
Government will have the last word on what an individual’s rights are, because its 
police will do what its officials and courts say.”  Even so, he adds, “that does not 
mean that the Government’s view is necessarily the correct view;” and, he remarks 
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further, “anyone who thinks it does must believe that men and women have only such 
moral rights as Government chooses to grant, which means that they have no moral 
rights at all.”22 
Most important in the context of juridical deliberation and decision is the fact, 
as Dworkin reminds that, “All this is sometimes obscured in the United States by the 
constitutional system.”  Indeed, whether evaluated positively or negatively in the 
relation of law and morality, Dworkin comments, “The Constitution fuses legal and 
moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on the answer to complex moral 
problems, like the problem of whether a particular statute respects the inherent 
equality of all men.”23  But, of course, the essential point is that both law and morality 
are interpreted constructively to declare such equality, possessed inherently and not 
merely as a matter of the fact that the Government in fact expresses itself in 
recognition of those rights. 
The “White-Black” racial divide in the USA, which has been of heightened 
visibility during the Trump Administration, elicits the difficult problem of 
interpretation of law in a context where appeals to positive law and natural law are in 
conflict.  Civil rights stipulated in statutory law presuppose natural “inalienable” 
rights, yet the opposition of “liberal” and “conservative” politics threaten commitment 
to such rights.  The political movement of “Black Lives Matter,” undertaken in the 
face of explicit “far right” “White” prejudice and in protest of repressive actions 
undertaken by law enforcement in numerous municipalities, calls into question any 
legitimate appeal to merely positivist law per se.  But, it is this racial divide, as 
enabled by Trump himself, that illustrates what is problematic politically when the 
rule of law is so readily dismissed by the executive branch and otherwise not disputed 
by Republican representatives of Congress who insist on partisan politics. 
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Indeed, it is remarkable that, as a matter of judicial philosophy, Dworkin can 
imagine a situation in which the US Supreme Court might not guarantee the 
individual rights of citizens, even though, as he puts it, a Supreme Court decision, qua 
legal decision, “must take into account precedent and institutional considerations like 
relations between the Court and Congress, as well as morality.”24  Importantly, in the 
setting of political demagoguery such as witnessed during the Trump Administration, 
one may consider Dworkin’s remarks: “So, though the constitutional system adds 
something to the protection of moral rights against the Government, it falls short of 
guaranteeing these rights, or even establishing what they are.”  In that case, a 
President, acting in what many would interpret to be executive overreach, may 
nonetheless claim that s/he may have “the last word” in matters of contention.  Trump 
certainly has positioned himself in this way vis-à-vis both the Congress and the 
courts. 
In the final count of the popular vote it is clear that President-Elect Joseph 
Biden received a historic number of votes from registered voters, many of whom were 
motivated to assure Trump’s defeat.  But, the very fact that some 74 million 
Americans cast their vote for Trump, many supporting an “alt-right” “white 
nationalist” political agenda, points to a dilemma for the American public at large and 
for the American judicial system that is analogous to the transition of the Weimar 
Republic to that of National Socialism.  When “armed, rightwing, Trump-supporting 
militias” bring “fear and violence to cities across the country in the wake of anti-
racism protests,”25 in the absence of Trump as president unambiguously objecting to 
such violence, there is ample cause for trepidation. These protests have been 
undertaken according to recognized fundamental rights to life, freedom of speech and 
peaceful assembly. The concern is that some political quarters are prepared to 
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advance an undeniably racist agenda—even if it means, in consequence, that America 
moves away from its traditional democratic governance by rule of law to “the rule of 
men” such as Trump is keen to assert.  In this case we would have the sort of political 
arrogance26 that would insidiously install the rule of men, specifically “the rule of 
Trump,” as if this were entirely consistent with the Constitution and federal statutory 
law, let alone appeals to natural law.  Throughout his presidency Trump has provided 
ample evidence of his will to thwart what he takes to be an uncooperative Congress, 
through “increased use of executive orders and other presidential directives,” a 
disposition that in the practice of the executive branch has had its precedent,27 but not 
to the extent Trump has chosen to do so. 
Trump’s attention to conservative judicial appointments likewise has 
presumed the courts will favor partisan political interests, even as some argue that the 
Supreme Court itself has promoted “independent presidential power” (especially in 
foreign affairs) when otherwise it might refrain from doing so, given that a president 
may abuse that power in assuming the same plenary and exclusive power is to be 
exercised in domestic affairs.28  Within the community of legal scholars there are, of 
course, those who hold an expansive view of executive power that would enable a 
president such as Trump to move closer to an autocratic style of governance, and this 
includes constitutional scholar John Yoo29 and recently appointed US Supreme Court 
associate justice Brett M. Kavanaugh.30 
Arendt’s Relevance to 2020 America 
It should be a matter of moral inquietude that some such as Yoo and Kavanaugh are 
prepared to provide a legal, even constitutional, basis for expansion of presidential 
power.  Why so? There is in present context a lesson to be garnered from political 
philosopher Hannah Arendt. Consider that, when she wrote her reputed Eichmann in 
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Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Arendt commented that the audience for 
the trial was “supposed to consist of Israelis…to show them what it meant to live 
among non-Jews, to convince them that only in Israel could a Jew be safe and live an 
honorable life.”31  Yet, those who witnessed the trial, Arendt opined, “knew by heart 
all that there was to know, and who were in no mood to learn any lessons and 
certainly did not need this trial to draw their own conclusions.”  After all, in this 
“theater” of a trial, there before them, for all to see, was “the monster” responsible for 
Nazi genocide.  “Was Eichmann, like all other Nazis, not a monster?  Surely he was.”  
Such was the expected refrain from the observer of this scene in which justice was to 
be done. “For,” so the question was to be posed, “how could such unprecedented evil 
be perpetrated without monstrosity?”  But, Arendt concluded otherwise, speaking 
instead of “the banality of evil.” 
It behooves all Americans today to consider the lesson of the banality of evil 
that Arendt has expounded, for the perpetration of widespread injustices does not 
need monstrous men with evil motives.  Laws grounded in a positivist account of 
lawful authority can well conduce to immoral conduct such as Arendt describes to 
occur as the banality of evil.   Consider that in relation to the question as to why the 
Jews did not revolt when led to the death camps—as if the victim rather than the 
Nazis were to be held to account for the crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity—Arendt cited the view of David Rousset, who had been imprisoned at 
Buchenwald: 
The triumph of the S.S. demands that the tortured victim allow himself to be 
led to the noose without protesting, that he renounce and abandon himself to 
the point of ceasing to affirm his identity.  And it is not for nothing.  It is not 
gratuitously, out of sheer sadism, that the S.S. men desire his defeat.  They 
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know that the system which succeeds in destroying its victim before he 
mounts the scaffold … is incomparably the best for keeping a whole people in 
slavery.  In submission.  Nothing is more terrible than these processions of 
human beings going like dummies to their deaths.32 
In the absence of an answer to the question about Jewish resistance raised in 
Eichmann’s trial, Arendt reminded, “There exist many things considerably worse than 
death, and the S.S. saw to it that none of them was ever very far from their victims’ 
minds and imagination.” 
But, precisely thereby, if what transpired in the Nazi genocide of the Jews was 
not a monstrosity but a banality, what did Arendt mean? The concept ‘banality of 
evil’ has had its ample discourse since Arendt pronounced it in her report on the 
Eichmann trial.33  But she herself described the phenomenon clearly (taking it here as 
phenomenological “description” rather than as a scientific “explanation”): 
…when I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, 
pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial.  Eichmann 
was not Iago34 and not Macbeth,35 and nothing would have been farther from 
his mind than to determine with Richard III “to prove a villain.” Except for an 
extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he had no 
motives at all.  And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; he certainly 
would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post.  He 
merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing…He 
was not stupid.  It was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means 
identical with stupidity—that predisposed him to become one of the greatest 
criminals of that period.  And if this is “banal” and even funny, if with the best 
will in the world one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from 
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Eichmann, that is still far from calling it commonplace.  It surely cannot be so 
common that a man facing death, and moreover, standing beneath the gallows, 
should be able to think of nothing but what he has heard at funerals all his life, 
and that these “lofty words” should completely becloud the reality—of his 
own death.  That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can 
wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, 
are inherent in man—that was in fact the lesson one could learn in 
Jerusalem.36 
Thoughtlessness, a manifest remoteness from reality, to be seen as “fearsome, word-
and-thought-defying”—such banality was at the root of the evil such as Eichmann and 
other Nazis committed. 
 Engaging Arendt’s concept, philosopher Judith Butler commented, “Arendt 
wondered whether a new kind of historical subject had become possible with national 
socialism, one in which humans implemented policy, but no longer had ‘intentions’ in 
any usual sense…[She] feared that what had become ‘banal’ was non-thinking itself.  
This fact was not banal at all, but unprecedented, shocking, and wrong.”37  Indeed, 
Butler continued, “So if a crime against humanity had become in some sense ‘banal’ 
it was precisely because it was committed in a daily way, systematically, without 
being adequately named and opposed…[The crime] had become for the criminals 
accepted, routinized, and implemented without moral revulsion and political 
indignation and resistance.”  It is when a political leader such as Trump can utter 
literally thousands of patently false statements that banality enters the scene of 
American politics to its detriment.  And, accordingly, to cite Butler’s words in this 
context, there is need for “a broader reflection on the historically specific challenges 
of moral responsibility under dictatorship,” especially in the period of its onset. 
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 Arendt’s view is akin to that of Jewish studies scholar Peter J. Haas, who 
writes of a “Nazi ethic,” strange as the concept is likely to be to those who try to 
conceive the possibility of a post-Holocaust ethics.38  Haas is concerned to explain the 
fact that, in Nazi Germany, “normal, well-adjusted people acted atrociously over a 
sustained period of time,” regularly and as a matter of course: “people very much like 
you and me were in fact doing evil consistently and apparently in good conscience 
year after year.”39  But, how was this possible?  Haas considered two plausible 
explanations, one “intentionalist” (according to which individuals and communities 
chose to do evil) and the other “functionalist.”  The latter is pertinent in present 
context of American politics.  According to the functionalist explanation, “the Nazis 
were not demons or essentially evil, but rather that they were normal people who, 
under [an] unusual constellation of pressures and conditions chose a path of response 
that resulted in evil.”  On this latter account, “all people really—are capable of 
knowing what is right and what is good, but then are fully capable of consciously 
choosing to act otherwise.”40 
All people, Haas contends, not merely Germans who for whatever motivations 
became converted Nazis. Yet, rather than appropriate either hypothesis, Haas 
described instead a Nazi ethic according to which partisans of National Socialism 
could “talk coherently about right and wrong and good and bad,” but according to “a 
linguistic and symbolic culture.”   This political culture was advanced by party 
ideologues such as Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Krieck, and Alfred Bäumler, and 
appropriated by normal, everyday citizens of the Third Reich, as if all was in order 
and there was nothing out of the ordinary to be interrogated.  To connect this 
perspective to that of Arendt, it is to be noted that such a political culture can take 
root anywhere, even in a democracy such as the USA presumes itself to be.  And, 
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when it takes root it grows insidiously, before the majority takes notice and can take 
requisite action to counter what amounts to an existential threat for a democratic 
republic. 
Arendt suggested, at the time of her writing, that the banality of evil is not a 
commonplace among men.  Yet, there is reason to question that suggestion, even in 
the so-called democracy of democracies that the USA is presumed to be within the 
community of nations.  Most nation-states today presuppose that, despite the logic of 
sovereignty and dogma of Realpolitik dominant in international relations and 
American foreign policy, there remains a viable jus gentium to guide the behavior of 
nation-states both at home and abroad.  The USA itself is a State Party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, having ratified and acceded to 
the treaty in 1992, with the declaration that the US Constitution protects fundamental 
rights (freedom of speech, expression, and association) that are not to be restricted. 41  
But, neither federal statutory law nor international treaties can assure the American 
public of the rule of law if a positivist account of law is used surreptitiously to 
undermine the Constitution itself, consequent to abuse of power by an emboldened 
and unprincipled executive such as Trump. 
Problematic during the Trump Administration is not merely the policies and 
executive actions pursued.  Rather, the testimony of numerous mental health 
professionals and criminologists, acting on the grounds of a professional “duty to 
warn,” is that the election of Trump to the presidency constituted a national 
emergency, Trump himself a persistent danger to national security in view of his 
psychopathology and the violence that it engenders as its sequelae.42  “Mental health,” 
forensic psychiatrist Bandy Lee observes, “is fundamental to a well-functioning social 
and political life, but it is something we often take for granted, and we seldom stop to 
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consider the mental health of our leaders…[The] mental health of the president is an 
especially important matter that affects everyone in the public domain.”43 
In an article published in January 2017, Psychology Today editor-at-large Hara 
Estroff Marano posed three incisive questions about the unsettled debate among 
American mental health professionals concerning “the dangerous case”44 of Donald 
Trump serving as President of the United States: 
(1) “Can Donald Trump or any public figure be deemed to have mental illness, 
even based on specific, well-publicized criteria reflecting observable 
behavior?” 
(2) “Is it ethical or appropriate for mental health professionals to venture into 
public acts of diagnosis?” 
(3) “Is psychology a suitable instrument for addressing issues of 
governance?”45 
Marano’s questions were occasioned by a Facebook petition posted by psychologist 
John D. Gartner, who argued for removal of Trump from office because Trump has “a 
serious mental illness that renders him psychologically incapable of competently 
discharging the duties of President of the United States.”46  Over 61,000 mental health 
professionals signed Gartner’s petition.47  
Some mental health professionals perceived Gartner’s action as a violation of 
the American Psychiatric Association’s “Goldwater Rule” (GR), formulated in 1973, 
that is, Section 7.3 of its Principles of Medical Ethics: “it is unethical for a 
psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted an 
examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement.”48  The 
rule is consistent with the moral principles of non-maleficence and autonomy: a 
psychiatrist ought not, through his or her public remarks, cause harm to an individual 
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or disrespect that individual’s right of explicit consent to grant exception to otherwise 
protected confidentiality of medical assessments and associated records. Many 
rejected Gartner’s petition as unethical, but other psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
and psychotherapists supported it. 
Gartner asserted: “Donald Trump is dangerously mentally ill and 
temperamentally incapable of being president.  He has ‘malignant narcissism,’ which 
is different from narcissistic personality disorder and which is incurable.  It’s obvious 
from Trump’s behavior that he meets the diagnostic criteria for the disorder, which 
include anti-social behavior, sadism, aggressiveness, paranoia and grandiosity.”49  
Gartner thus states his observations of Trump’s overt behavior, without offering a 
clinical diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder as defined in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V).  The claim of “malignant 
narcissism” is a term for a “hypothetical syndrome,” first conceptualized by 
psychologist Erich Fromm,50 for whom malignant narcissism is a “severe mental 
illness”—“the most severe pathology and the root of the most vicious destructiveness 
and inhumanity.”  If indeed one is faced with an individual in that category of mental 
status with manifest correlative behavior, then clearly one is faced with a grave 
danger.  A professional psychiatrist in particular is in a position to recommend 
appropriate intervention.  Gartner does not provide a diagnosis, technically, if a 
diagnosis refers to the DSM-V taxonomy of mental disorders. Hence, Gartner does 
not violate the GR per se.  Insofar as he does identify a syndrome qua hypothesis, 
Gartner believes the available evidence51 of Trump’s overt behavior manifest in 
extensive public presentations is confirmatory of the hypothesis, to a high degree of 
probability. 
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Taking a position that finds Trump dangerous but not providing a diagnosis as 
specified in DSM-V, Lee presents her concern about the “effects” of Trump’s 
behavior on public health and safety, hence her focus on the concept of a “duty to 
warn.”52  Acknowledging that, “ethics are complex,” for her at issue in the production 
of the published volume of essays she edited was the question “whether there were 
overarching ethical principles that overrode the Goldwater rule” in the case of a man 
perceived to be unashamedly dangerous.  The GR, in her assessment, counts as “a 
lower-level rule” when juxtaposed to the duty to warn the American public.  In her 
sense of applicable rules, then, the fundamental rule of duty to warn (out of concern 
for public health, public welfare, and public interest) superintends a subsidiary 
obligation a professional psychiatrist has to a patient in the clinical setting, where 
indeed non-maleficence and autonomy are normally operative. 
Following the issuance of the “Mueller Report,” Lee and co-authors published 
a “mental health analysis” of Trump based on the data internal to that report.53  
Speaking of mental capacity, the authors provided “a functional, not a diagnostic, 
assessment, focused less on the President’s personal mental health than on his 
capacity to fulfill the duties of his office,” an assessment they made “with 
uncommonly high confidence.”  They opined: “In summary, we believe that the 
preponderance of evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that this 
President is incapable of making sound, rational, reality-based decisions free of 
impulsivity, recklessness, paranoid and other demonstrably false beliefs, with most 
notably an absorption in self-interest that precludes the consideration of national 
interest.” 54   Accordingly, they warned of “a profound danger to national and 
international security in the nuclear age,” indeed of “grave danger to national and 
international security that can no longer be overlooked.”55 
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Psychopathology and the Banality of Evil 
The debate among mental health professionals whether they should engage in public 
commentary concerning Trump’s behavior is characterized by two comportments: (1) 
those whose epistemological position of justified true belief makes public 
commentary morally permissible at least and, indeed, morally imperative as a duty to 
warn the American public; (2) those who subscribe to the Goldwater Rule (and its 
expansive annotations) judging public pronouncements by member psychiatrists “a 
dangerous morality” that is, in fact, no morality insofar as political motivations 
displace the proper motive to perform according to the duty of Section 7.3. To this is 
to be added interpretations of duty in legislative context, such as with Congressman 
Jamie Raskin (115th Congress, 2018-2019) introducing H.R. 1987 (House Bill)—
Oversight Commission on President Capacity Act.  This bill proposed to “mandate a 
procedure for medically and psychiatrically evaluating a president who is suspected of 
being incapacitated to a degree that would require removal under the 25th 
Amendment.”56 
 As for the question of Trump’s psychopathology evident in his personality and 
overt behavior, psychiatrists, criminologists, and philosophers have worked to 
describe the unique clinical presentation of the phenomenon.  Psychiatrist Claire 
Pouncey notes that mental illness presents “a philosophical challenge for empiricists,” 
because of its “intangibility,” hence raising questions about “confidence” about the 
research methods in use, even though psychiatrists believe they “can explain human 
behavior in terms of psychopathology.”57   This is a question of the scientific 
legitimacy of psychiatric taxonomy (i.e., classification), what counts as a disorder and 
what are the criteria that distinguish disorders (that is, that enable clinical diagnosis).  
Relevant to the present concern, Pouncey reminded of the work of J. Z. Sadler, who 
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has argued with reference to the DSM that “aesthetic, epistemic, ethical, ontological, 
and pragmatic values all have a role”58—the debate about the “danger” or “dangerous 
morality” of diagnosing Trump clearly calling attention to these “values” to a degree.  
Thus, a psychiatrist is expected to account for the fact that “extra-empirical 
considerations, including values, always fill the gap between our observations and the 
conclusions we draw from them.”59  When psychiatrists or psychologists “analyze” 
Trump, their observations are not merely empirical, satisfying some “realist” criteria 
of correspondence of observational statements to the behavioral phenomena under 
review.  There is also the psychiatrist’s interpretive act that includes prejudices in 
understanding.  Among those prejudices that need to be made explicit are the values 
at play, whether in the background or foreground of the psychological assessment.    
There is no automatic correspondence between observed behavior and 
diagnosis.  On the contrary, as Pouncey reminds, psychopathology presents the 
psychiatrist with “fundamentally complex phenomena;” any examination of a 
presumptive disorder requires “conceptual fecundity.”60  Pouncey, therefore, raised 
the important epistemological question: “Given our basic empiricist epistemology, 
and given that psychopathology consists in phenomena that cannot be directly 
observed, on what basis do we have confidence in our nomenclature and our 
classifications? [...] Can we identify and characterize psychopathology on empirical 
grounds alone, or must philosophy play a role?”61 
This is an important question for ostensible diagnosis of Trump’s “mental” 
health or illness.  There are assumptions being made: psychiatrists engaged in this 
debate have “justified true beliefs” (hence satisfying logical criteria for truth qua 
correspondence) and “valid inferences” from observations of overt behavior to causes 
(whether genetic, neurobiological, psychotic, environmental, habitual, etc.).  But, 
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there is no professional agreement as to the veracity of either the justification of those 
beliefs or the inferences made.  Pouncey reminds that, “diagnostic test results are 
measured along a continuum, and that categorical thresholds are subsequently 
imposed.”62  Hence, questions about scientific reliability (as “empirical” validity) add 
to expressed concern about the morality of “diagnosing at a distance.”  
Practitioners of psychology and psychiatry normally understand they have 
professional duties consistent with various moral principles articulated in codes of 
professional ethics. The two primary principles governing the practitioner-patient 
relationship are normally rank-ordered, thus: (1) the principle of non-maleficence (do 
no harm) and (2) the principle of beneficence (do good to the extent of professional 
ability/competence).  Other principles, e.g., consequentialism’s principle of utility, 
deontology’s categorical imperative (law of humanity) and principle of autonomy, 
etc., may be added, of course, consistent with any principled approach to moral 
decision-making in the setting of clinical practice or in view of a collectively taken 
recommendation concerning public law, public policy, or public regulation. 
Engaging the relation of theoretical and philosophical psychology, philosopher 
N. K. Swazo considered the ethical problem that concerns appeal to a given 
theoretical structure in psychology, whether such a structure is “ontologically reliable, 
i.e., that it satisfies reasonably compelling criteria of correspondence to reality.”63  
This issue of correspondence to reality is central to the conflict between behaviorists 
and psychoanalysts about what they study, how they account for it, and how 
theoretical and methodological commitments are manifested in codes of conduct.  
Hence, as Swazo remarked, “anyone concerned to articulate a responsible 
professional ethic but who does so on the basis of an unexamined intellectual 
allegiance does harm rather than good, for any principles adduced to guide 
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professional practice are compromised from the outset by ontological inadequacy,”64 
that is, by a lack of correspondence to reality.  Psychiatrists practicing under the 
theoretical influence of psychoanalysis thus object to violation of the GR in the 
absence of examination of an individual as patient and according to the diagnostic 
procedures of psychoanalysis; whereas, in contrast, behaviorists are quick to respond 
that they are examining overt behavior and not mental or covert causally determinate 
phenomena as such, for example, not determining the relation of “unconscious” 
causes to “conscious” thoughts and consequent or correspondent behavior, mental 
states so understood thus irrelevant to their assessments.65  
Hence, when it comes to the GR, the theoretical-situational context of the 
individual professional practitioner commenting on a public personality such as 
Trump cannot be ignored.  Former psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson, writing his Against 
Therapy (1994), is an example of a practitioner engaged in self-examination, who 
complained at the time that, professional training leads to “a psychologic 
amalgamation of the person with the function that he is to perform.”66  Thus, even in 
present context of the debate over the authority of the GR, it is important to remember 
that, “Theoretical commitments have their consequences in practice even as they are 
comprised of ontological and epistemological commitments”67—that is, the latter 
means what counts as reliable theory, reliable methods of analysis, diagnostic criteria, 
categories of mental disease or behavioral dysfunction, methods and scope of 
treatment (different in the case of psychoanalysis and behaviorism), etc. 
If mental health practitioners are morally correct to offer public commentary, 
then the operative assumptions are that: (1) there is a rational basis for such 
assessments; (2) this is articulated in relation to American citizens’ right to know; and 
(3) American citizens have a right to expect their elected president to be mentally 
	 24	
competent to hold office. This “right” is grounded in either Article 2 of the US 
Constitution (with authorized declaration of incompetence then allowing for Congress 
to exercise its check on executive behavior through the procedures of impeachment 
and conviction) or removal from office through Article 25. 
In view of the above, Americans who respond favorably to Trump’s sophistic 
rhetoric may be characterized to be “under his influence” in the way those suffering 
from psychopathy affect those around them.  And, it is in this sense of psychological 
effect that the banality of evil such as Arendt characterized it may find its entrance 
into the body politic, thus to engender the sort of thoughtlessness among the 
American electorate. The work of Paul Babiak (corporate psychologist) and Robert 
Hare (specialist in psychopathy) provides one empirical context for hypothesis that 
has not been considered fully as part of the ostensible duty to warn.  Consider that Dr. 
Lance Dodes (formerly assistant professor of clinical psychiatry at Harvard Medical 
School and affiliated currently with the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute) 
has claimed that President Trump is at least “close to psychosis when he’s 
stressed…All of his delusional ideas come up when he is stressed in some way, and 
then he loses track of reality because it doesn’t fit what he needs to believe…[He] is 
villainous because of his sociopathy and psychopathy but with a tremendous veneer 
that he’s extremely good at it.”68 
Such remarks are clearly presumptively diagnostic with reference to overt 
behavior—psychosis, delusion, dissociation from reality, sociopathy, psychopathy. 
Obviously, any hypothesis in the above sense is expected to have its ready 
confirmation or falsification according to reliable scientific methods in the discipline, 
in this case clinical psychology/psychiatry.  In the case of remarks such as Dodes 
offers, of course, there is neither confirmation nor falsification unless and until Trump 
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is subjected to the appropriate diagnostic tests developed for individual personality 
assessment (e.g., psychometric evaluations such the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised). 
Confirmation and/or falsification would also have to account for the fact of 
“individual variation in psychopathy” in the general population and the kind of 
evidence related to “whether psychopathy is associated with deficits in…distinct 
moral domains [that is, “harm, fairness, group loyalty, respect for authority, and 
purity”].”69  In their informative book published in 2007, entitled Snakes in Suits: 
When Psychopaths Go to Work (which relates to Hare’s other book, entitled Without 
Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us, published in 1999), 
Babiak and Hare describe the behavior of corporate psychopaths in particular.  
Important in the context of allegations of psychopathology with reference to Trump is 
that white-collar corporate psychopaths are not readily recognized to be such (in 
contrast to “blue collar” psychopaths readily to be found among recidivist and often 
violent criminals readily arrested and incarcerated).  Important to any assessment in 
present context, psychopaths can be cognitively functional yet suffer from a persistent 
deficit in moral judgment, due to lack of a conscience that normally functions to 
govern such judgment. 
Babiak and Hare provide “profiles” of “generic psychopaths,” that is, typical 
descriptions of personality traits “based upon composites of psychopathic 
characteristics derived from published reports, the news media, and [their] own 
research about such personalities.”70  Psychopaths are normally distinguished in 
clinical taxonomies from sociopaths, neurotics, and psychotics, although there are 
some commonalities in perceived behavior. According to these two specialists, 
psychopaths are individuals lacking in conscience (understood in both moral 
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psychology and moral philosophy to be the seat of moral judgment) and, therefore, 
these individuals are “incapable of empathy, guilt, or loyalty to anyone but 
themselves.”  [The foregoing and following quotations are excerpts from Babiak and 
Hare (2007).] 
Psychopaths can be “egocentric in the extreme…seemingly unable to 
experience deep human emotions, especially love and compassion.”  In interpersonal 
relations “psychopaths tend to overreact in response to perceived personal insults or 
insufficient demonstration of respect for their authority.” More important, “They are 
known for their ability to don many masks, change ‘who they are’ depending on the 
person with whom they are interacting, and make themselves appear likable to their 
intended victim.”  Thus, “Because they see most people as weak, inferior, and easy to 
deceive, psychopathic con artists will often tell you that their victims deserve what 
they got.”  The psychopathic personality manipulates others to serve his interests with 
determined effect: “Amazingly, more often than not, victims will eventually come to 
doubt their own knowledge of the truth and change their own views to believe what 
the psychopath tells them rather than what they know to be true.”  
Both mental health professionals and the public media have identified the 
foregoing behaviors to be persistently evident in Trump.  The political consequences 
of psychopathic behavior, however, are often not recognized until the damage has 
been done (in the same way Arendt refers to Shakespeare’s Iago whose knavery is not 
evident until it is spent)—hence the reasonably valid duty to warn the American 
public as so many mental health professionals have argued.  If it is the case that the 
victims of the psychopath eventually come to doubt their own knowledge of the truth 
and change their views according to the sophistry of the psychopathic personality, it is 
no wonder that the banality of evil can install itself in the collective public 
	 27	
consciousness to its moral and political injury.  This is the lesson Arendt has delivered 
for all who see the need for institutional bulwarks against totalitarian tendencies—
even in the USA.71 
We cannot assume that a political leader elected to national office is not 
affected by psychopathy.  One cannot assume philosophically that all humans as 
rational beings have a conscience that directs them to do right rather than wrong and 
to manifest empathy in the face of human suffering.  Trump’s overt behavior betrays 
his absence of conscience and lack of empathy in the face of the suffering of 
Americans, especially clear in the failed federal government’s control of the 
coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic as the interests of corporate economics 
mattered to Trump more than public health.  The fact is that the foregoing assessment 
of behavioral traits such as Hare and Babiak disclose is supported by more recent 
studies.72 These hypothesize that, “psychopaths have normal understanding of right 
and wrong, but abnormal regulation of morally appropriate behavior.”  When such 
behavior is found in an individual undiagnosed as a psychopathic personality, these 
traits are especially disturbing because of the harm and wrongdoing that such an 
individual does before anyone knows the better as to the causal determinants of the 
observed behavior or the likely harmful consequences that ensue.  This is, as Swazo 
put it, a “grave problem of conscience”73 for those interacting with one suffering from 
psychopathy, collectively often becoming unwitting sycophants. 
The ordinary citizen, along with moral philosophers (e.g., Immanuel Kant), 
assumes that (a) everyone has a conscience and, thus, that (b) everyone is more or less 
rational in the exercise of his or her moral judgment, notwithstanding reasonable 
bases of moral disagreement both theoretical and practical and individuals being 
irrational yet amenable to correction.  In the case of a psychopath, however, this 
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assumption is misplaced when cognitive efficacy combines with a deficit in empathy 
and absence of conscientious moral judgment.  And, that is the unmistakable danger 
of Donald Trump at the helm of the executive branch of government.  A psychopathic 
personality is all the more dangerous in that official capacity, precisely because of the 
communicative efficiency of sophistic deception that enables the banality of evil. 
Americans in 2021 are not in a political culture analogous to Germans in 1930 
Germany.  But, under conditions of hostile party politics and the “White-Black” racial 
divide that Trump has energized to call forth a political base of “Trumpenvolk,”74 they 
can be readily as gullible as were the Germans in the face of the psychological appeal 
of Hitler’s political rhetoric that installed the Third Reich.  One ought not 
underestimate the danger of a large percentage of the American electorate 
succumbing to Trump’s blatant mendacity, to the point that their unwitting 
thoughtlessness provides fertile ground for an irreversible deformation of the 
American democracy.  There is much yet to be understood empirically as to why 75 
million Americans voted for Trump in 2020, despite his rampant falsehoods about any 
number of issues of electoral politics.  A “good citizen,” guided by a positivist legal 
philosophy at best and thoughtlessness at worst, is not necessarily a “good person” 
guided by a reasonably compelling moral philosophy. The preservation of the 
American constitutional order, as Arendt understood in her study of totalitarianism, 
requires the exercise of both political and philosophical responsibility in the face of an 
unprecedented assault on truth, on law, and on morality.  A public duty to warn is, 
therefore, a call for all Americans to exercise due moral and political diligence, 
irrespective of allegiance to political party, thus to safeguard the American republic 
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